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28 
Human rights obligations to the poor 
MONICA HAKIMI* 
Poverty unquestionably detracts from the human rights mission. Modern 
human rights law recognizes a broad range of rights - for example, "to 
life, liberty, and security of person" and to adequate "food, clothing, 
and medical care."1 Any number of those rights might go unrealized in 
conditions of extreme poverty. However, human rights law has always 
been partly aspirational. For those seeking to improve the lives of the 
poor, the key question is not what rights exist but how to make those 
rights operational. What does human rights law actually require of states? 
And how might its obligations benefit the poor? 
28.1 Human rights obligations 
Human rights instruments typically assign states obligations separately 
from recognizing rights. Many treaties - including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - define 
state obligations amorphously. Under the ICCPR, states must "respect 
and ... ensure" rights. 2 The I CESCR generally requires states to "take 
steps" toward realizing rights. 3 
In his influential book, Basic Rights, Henry Shue argued for further 
specifying human rights obligations.4 Shue contested the view, then 
* This chapter is a condensed and slightly modified version of M. Hakimi, "State Bystander 
Responsibility," Eur. J. Int'/ L., 21(2010),341. 
1 GA Res. 217 A, UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/180, Arts. 3, 25 (December 
12, 1948); see also ICCPR, GA Res. 2200A, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/2200 
(December 16, 1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976); ICESCR, GA Res. 2200A, UN 
GAOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. A/6316 (December 16, 1966) (entered into force January 3, 
1976). 
2 ICCPR, Art. 2( I). 3 ICESCR, Art. 2(1). 
4 H. Shue, Basic Rights, 2nd edn. (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 52. 
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dominant in the human rights literature, that every right grounds a single, 
correlative obligation. He argued that the same ICCPR or ICESCR right 
might ground multiple obligations. And he identified three: obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill. 5 Obligations to respect are paradigmatic obli-
gations not to violate rights. They are well established in human rights 
law. Obligations to protect require states to restrain third parties from 
violating rights. Obligations to fulfill assume no particular abuser; they 
require states to foster positive instead of negative liberties. 
Shue's typology helped inform the human rights treaties. Consider the 
ICCPR right to life. 6 That right unquestionably grounds an obligation not 
to kill people arbitrarily (obligation to respect). Shue demonstrated that, 
based on the same right, states might have to restrain third parties from 
killing (obligation to protect). States might even have to give people access 
to emergency medical care (obligation to fulfill). 7 Similarly, the I CESCR 
right to food had been understood to require states to try to make food 
more widely available (obligation to fulfill). 8 Shue suggested that states 
might have to refrain from forcibly depriving people of food (obligation 
to respect) and prevent third parties from doing the same (obligation to 
protect). Of course, Shue's obligations could easily be rephrased as new 
rights. The obligation to respect the right to food might be rephrased as 
the right not to be forcibly deprived of food by the state. But the right 
to food had already been conceptualized and codified in more general 
terms. Shue was influential because he presented a vision for develop-
ing human rights law consistently with its own conceptual and textual 
foundations. 
28.2 Obligations to protect 
Obligations to protect have new energy in international law, because var-
ious actors now underscore that state sovereignty - historically a shield 
5 Shue, Basic Rights. Shue refers to these obligations as obligations to avoid, protect, and 
aid. The respect, protect, and fulfill language is conceptually the same and dominates the 
human rights literature. 
6 ICCPR, Art. 6. 
7 Cf. Samity v. State of W B. (1996) 4 SCC 36 (India) (finding that right to life grounds 
obligation to provide emergency medical care). 
8 ICESCR, Art. 11. 
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from human rights criticism- is instead a justification for requiring states 
to protect people from third-party harm.9 The idea is neither novel nor 
radical. Political theorists have long cited obligations to protect to justify 
the state's very existence. 10 States exist, at least in part, to protect their 
populations from harm and to enforce the law against those who might 
intrude on individual liberties. In human rights law, decision-makers now 
claim, prescribe, and apply such obligations in a broad range of contexts. 
For example, several human rights treaties obligate states to protect peo-
ple from abuses committed by private actors. 11 States acknowledge that 
they have such obligations, 12 and courts and treaty bodies enforce and 
apply them. 13 In the Genocide Case, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) determined that states must protect against acts of genocide com-
mitted by or in another state. 14 And many actors now endorse a concept 
that they term the "Responsibility to Protect." 15 The concept posits that: 
(i) each state must protect its own population from war crimes and mass 
9 See, e.g. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsi-
bility to Protect" (2001), p. 13, www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp; High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges & Changes, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," UN Doc. 
A/59/565 (2004), paras. 29-30; see also M. Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 
Dissent, 49 (2002), 114, 119: "State sovereignty, instead of being the enemy of human 
rights, has to be seen as their basic precondition." 
10 For an overview, see S. J. Heyman, "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty 
and the Fourteenth Amendment," Duke L. f., 41 (1991), 507. 
11 See, e.g. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Art. 2(e), GA Res. 34/180, UN GAOR Supp., 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/34/180 (December 
18, 1979) (entered into force September 3, 1981) (hereinafter, CEDAW); and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, Art. 19(1), GA Res. 44/25, Annex, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., UN 
Doc. A/44/49 (November 20, 1989) (entered into force September 2, 1990). 
12 See, e.g. Albfm-Cornejo v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 171 (November 22, 2007), para. ll; and Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), "Initial Report: Honduras," UN Doc. CCPR/C/HND/2005/l (April 26, 2005), 
paras. 45-53. 
13 See, e.g. Report of the HRC, "Concluding Observations: Mali," UN Doc. A/58/40 (Vol. 
I) (2003), at 47, para. 81(16); Report of the CESCR, 25th Sess., April23-May 11,2001, 
"Concluding Observations: Togo," UN Doc. E/2002/22, at 57, paras. 316, 322-3; and 
Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46477/99, para. 56, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2002). 
14 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 ICJ 1, paras. 429-30 
(February 26) (hereinafter, Genocide Case). 
15 See, e.g. SC Res. 1674, para. 4, UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (April28, 2006); 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, GA Res. 60/l, para. 138, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (September 16, 2005); and UN 
Secretary-General, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect," paras. 8-9, UN Doc. 
A/63/677 (January 12, 2009). 
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atrocities; and (ii) if one state fails, that obligation shifts to the interna-
tional community as a whole. 
Although that practice is extensive, it also is disjointed. Decision-
makers prescribe and apply the obligation ad hoc and for discrete contexts 
at a time. 16 Not surprisingly, then, their decisions are at times misguided, 
inconsistent, and even conceptually confused. 17 In other work, I pre-
sented a generalized framework on "state bystander responsibility" -
when states are and should be responsible for failing to satisfy obligations 
to protect. 18 The framework is partly interpretive and partly normative. 
It is interpretive in that it explains most of the existing practice. Sur-
veying the practice across different contexts and legal sources, it extracts 
the common principles that animate obligations to protect. Because the 
practice is splintered, however, the framework also constructs a vision of 
where the practice should go. In short, it seeks to nudge the practice in 
a particular direction, as indicated by the dominant trends. I outline my 
framework below. 
28.2.1 Relationship with the abuser 
The interest in protecting people from harm motivates human rights law 
but does not (by itself) define the obligation to protect. First, that inter-
est does not identify which state must act in any particular case. Unless 
all states must protect against all third-party harms, something more is 
needed- some additional nexus - to justify assigning the obligation to a 
particular state. Second, the interest in restraining abusive third parties is 
inevitably in tension with desired limits on the state's restraints. Some such 
limits appear in human rights law itself. If a state suspects that someone is 
planning a killing spree, the interest in protecting potential victims favors 
requiring the state to restrain the suspect. But the interest in protect-
ing the suspect (from undue state intrusion) justifies limiting the state's 
restraints. 19 Analogous considerations appear elsewhere in international 
law. For example, international legal norms discourage states from uni-
laterally influencing intergovernmental organizations (lOs) outside the 
16 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 349-50. 
17 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 350-4 and nn. 113-17, 127-30, 257-61. 
18 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 354-76. 
19 Cf. Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, para. 116, Eur. Ct. H. R. (1998) 
(hereinafter, Osman) (asserting that the obligation must be defined "in a manner which 
fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on 
the scope of [police] action"). 
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lOs' ordinary decision-making processes.20 Those norms circumscribe 
when and how states should restrain abusive lOs. Obligations to protect 
must manage those tensions. They require a normative judgment that, 
given the state's particular relationship with the abuser, its restraints are 
desirable and not overly intrusive. 
That determination will sometimes be difficult or indeterminate. But 
for many common relationships in the international legal order, the prac-
tice offers substantial guidance. Paradigmatically, obligations to protect 
require a state to restrain private abusers in its territory.21 The domi-
nant explanation for why is textual.22 Many human rights treaties bind 
a state only in its own territory or jurisdiction. 23 If those treaties estab-
lish obligations to protect, then (the reasoning goes) those obligations 
are essentially territorial. That account is insufficient. First, it does not 
explain why human rights treaties codify territorial or jurisdictional lim-
itations in the first place. Second, it does not identify when states have 
jurisdiction- and therefore obligations to protect- outside their national 
territories. Third, it does not explain why obligations to protect are pri-
marily territorial, even when the treaties establishing them lack explicit 
territorial or jurisdictionallimits.24 Obligations to protect are primarily 
territorial because statehood defines the relevant relationships in an area 
and justifies requiring states to satisfy certain minimum standards. A state 
must keep its house in order- in Max Huber's words, "display therein the 
activities of a state."25 
States host in their territories not only private actors, but also other 
states and lOs. The practice on whether states must restrain those actors 
is relatively sparse. In one notable opinion, the Venice Commission of 
the Council of Europe addressed the question of whether European states 
had to protect against abuses committed during the CIA's detention and 
20 See A. S. Muller, International Organizations and Their Host States (The Hague/ 
London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 149 (asserting that a "very impor-
tant goal" of the rules on lOs is "to ensure the independence of the organization from 
any interference by any individual state"). 
21 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 360-1 (discussing practice). 
22 See M. Milanovic, "From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State 
'Jurisdiction' in Human Rights Treaties," Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 8 (2008), 411, 412: "(T]he 
scope of extraterritorial application of [human rights] treaties ultimately hinges" on "the 
notion of'jurisdiction"' in the tre~ty texts. 
23 See, e.g. ICCPR, Art. 2( 1). 
24 See, e.g. ICESCR (no explicit jurisdictional limitation); and CEDAW (same). 
25 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. US), 2 RIAA 829, 854-5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (Huber, sole 
arb.). 
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rendition program.26 The Venice Commission concluded that each Euro-
pean state had to protect against abuses in its airspace or territory. The 
commission supported that conclusion by citing the well-established rule 
that states must protect against private abuses in their territories. The 
commission then reasoned, "[t]his is even more true in respect of agents 
of foreign states."27 
That reasoning is only partially correct. The commission rightly deter-
mined that a state must restrain third parties, including other states, in 
its territory. However, a state's obligations should be weaker against other 
states than against private actors. Varied legal norms limit when and how 
host states influence other states. 28 Such norms are intended to foster 
cooperation and friendly relations among states and to preserve their 
legal equality. The Venice Commission implicitly accommodated those 
norms. It did not direct European states to invoke their expansive domes-
tic authorities against the United States, as it almost certainly would have 
done if the United States were a private actor. Instead, the commission 
directed European states to try to restrain the CIA while managing other 
treaty commitments and the rules on immunity.29 
By contrast, states generally need not restrain third parties in other 
states. If anything, international law discourages states from unilater-
ally exercising governmental authority - and thereby restraining third 
parties- outside their territories.30 That norm against extraterritoriality 
carries less weight when a population suffers serious harm. In such cases, 
a state might have the right to restrain external abusers.31 But any right 
26 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 363/2005 on the International Legal Obligations of 
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-state 
Transport of Prisoners, Doc. CDL-AD(2006)009 (2006) (hereinafter, Venice Commission 
Opinion). 
27 Venice Commission Opinion, para. 126. 
28 See, e.g. S. Murphy, Principles of International Law (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2006), 
pp. 259-67 (discussing rules on immunity); and G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw 
States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 26-9 (discussing legal equality 
of states). 
29 Venice Commission Opinion, paras. 157-9. 
30 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
GA Res. 2625, Annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028, at 122 
(October 24, 1970) (endorsing principle of non-interference); and R. Jennings and A. 
Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn. (London and Harlow: Longman, 1992), 
pp. 382-90 (discussing state independence and territorial authority). 
31 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Sp.),Judgment, 1970 ICJ 3, paras. 
33-4 (February 5) (identifying erga omnes obligations as those owed to all states); see 
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has not developed into an operative legal obligation. Decision-makers 
sometimes claim that it has. For example, the claim of the Responsibility 
to Protect is that all states must protect against especially severe abuses no 
matter where they occur. 32 Although the claim is directed at all states, it 
is essentially unenforceable and in practice unenforced against particular 
bystander states.33 It does not reflect an operative obligation to protect. 
Nevertheless, the general rule against extraterritorial obligations to 
protect has certain exceptions. For example, a state typically has such 
obligations if it exercises complete control over foreign territory.34 The 
logic is similar to that which applies in a state's own territory.35 The state 
should maintain order in the area and avoid a vacuum of governance 
authority. Thus, in the Armed Activities Case, Uganda had to protect 
people in occupied Congo because Uganda alone exercised governmental 
authority there.36 The logic differs when a state has some territorial 
generally C. J, Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) (concluding that states may take countermeasures for severe erg a 
omnesviolations in other states). 
32 See, e.g. n. 15 above and accompanying text; SC Res. 681, para. 5, UN Doc. S/RES/681 
(December 20, 1990) (war crimes); and Genocide Case, paras. 429-30 (genocide). 
33 See, e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, "Improving Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law: ICRC Expert Seminars" (October 2003), p. 5, 
www.icrc.org/ eng/ assets/files/ other/improving_compliance_with...ihl-oct-.2003 .pdf (ask-
ing how to translate the claim on war crimes into "state practices and policies"); Insti-
tut de Droit International, lOth Commission, "Present Problems of the Use of Force 
in International Law" (September 21, 2007) (prepared by W. M. Reisman), p. 176, 
www.idi- iil.org/idiF/annuaireF/ 1 Oth_comJeger _b.pdf (concluding that "responsibility" 
in responsibility to protect is "not a 'duty' to act"); see also D. Miller, National Respon-
sibility and Global Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 98: "[A]n undistributed 
duty ... to which everybody is subject is likely to be discharged by nobody unless it can 
be allocated in some way." 
34 See, e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 ICJ 168, paras. 172-80 (December 19) (hereinafter, Armed Activities); 
Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/34, paras. 76--7, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001) (hereinafter, 
Cyprus); and Report of the CESCR, 19th Sess., November 16-December 4, 1998, "Con-
cluding Observations: Israel," UN Doc. E/1999/22, paras. 232, 234 (1999). 
35 See, e.g. Cyprus, para. 78 (justifying Turkish obligations in Cyprus partly on the ground 
that "any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights 
protection"); and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16, para. 118 (June 21): "Physical control of a territory ... is 
the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States." 
36 Armed Activities, paras. 172-80; see also D. Fleck, The Handbook of International Humani-
tarian Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 280: "The occupying power must 
also take all measures to protect the inhabitants of occupied territories from violence by 
third parties." 
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control but lacks complete authority to govern. In such cases, the state 
might be discouraged from exercising the kind of authority necessary to 
restrain abusers. In Cyprus v. Turkey, Turkey exercised some territorial 
control in Northern Cyprus, but the Turkish Cypriots exercised most 
administrative authority.37 Restraining private abusers in Northern 
Cyprus would have required Turkey to expand its authority- a move 
that would have undermined the broader interest in an independent and 
unified Cyprus. In the end, Turkey did not have to restrain private actors 
in the area; that job properly fell to the Turkish Cypriots.38 
In addition, several important decisions extend the obligation extrater-
ritorially when a state substantially enables an external actor to violate 
rights but does not establish appropriate restraints. In the Genocide Case, 
the ICJ determined that Serbia had not participated in the genocidal con-
duct of the Bosnian Serbs, but Serbia had failed to satisfy an obligation to 
protect.39 Serbia supported the Bosnian Serbs politically and militarily, 
and it helped to oversee and direct them.40 Having placed the Bosnian 
Serbs in a position to violate rights, Serbia could not lawfully stand by 
in the face of their violations. 41 Analogous considerations inform both 
Cyprus and Ila?CU v. Moldova and Russia.42 In each case, the defendant 
state propped up and provided immense support to an abusive external 
actor. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot administration,43 and Rus-
sia did the same for separatists in Moldova.44 The claimants could not 
demonstrate that, since ratifying the European Convention on Human 
Rights, those states participated in the abuse. Nevertheless, the European 
Court of Human Rights held them responsible. The court's reasoning on 
why they were responsible is unclear,45 but the best answer is that they 
failed to satisfy their obligations to protect. 
Those cases make good sense. A state that substantially supports an 
external actor has already involved itself in another state's affairs. The 
normative considerations that usually discourage states from unilaterally 
37 Cyprus. 
38 Cyprus, paras. 80-1, 272, 347-8, 376. The Cyprus court is unclear on why Turkey's 
obligations flowed from the abuses committed by the Turkish Cypriot administration 
but not from the abuses committed by private actors. See Hakimi, "State Bystander 
Responsibility," pp. 353-4, 377-8. 
39 Genocide Case, paras. 386, 438. 40 Genocide Case, paras. 422, 434-8. 
41 For more analysis, see Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 364-5. 
42 Ila~cu v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2004) (hereinafter, 
Ila~cu). 
43 Cyprus, paras. 76-7. 44 Ila~cu, para. 392. 
45 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 353, 365-6. 
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restraining external actors- the interests of non-interference and fostering 
friendly relations among states- either are less pronounced or have already 
been compromised. They are outweighed by the interest in protecting 
human life. Moreover, the enabling state's contribution warrants assigning 
the obligation to that state, even though not to all others. 
28.2.2 Severity of harm 
Whether a state has the obligation also depends on the kind of harm at 
issue. States must protect only against conduct that: (i) causes serious 
physical or psychological harm; or (ii) affects people because they belong 
to a vulnerable group. Conduct in the first category usually intrudes on 
physical security. Torture, rape, slavery, extrajudicial killings, forced dis-
appearances, and other cruel or inhuman treatment all trigger obligations 
to protect. Conduct in the second category typically discriminates on the 
basis of a protected status -for example, because the person is a woman, 
child, racial minority, or person with a disability. Such conduct is harm-
ful because it reinforces existing inequalities or undermines the victim's 
capacity to participate fully in public life.46 
Limiting the obligation to those two categories of conduct resolves 
apparent inconsistencies in the practice. Decision-makers sometimes 
assert that states must protect against all harms, no matter how severe. 47 
That claim does not reflect the practice as applied. Treaties that expressly 
establish the obligation do so almost exclusively for conduct falling in the 
above two categories.48 The post-ratification practice follows the same 
general pattern.49 
Readers may worry that this limitation exposes a lacuna in the human 
rights regime. Certain conduct may intrude on rights without triggering 
any obligation to protect. As a practical matter, the worry is most pro-
nounced for economic and social rights. Although some conduct that 
interferes with those rights triggers an obligation to protect, 50 most such 
conduct does not. Human rights law partly addresses the lacuna with 
46 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 367-9 (reviewing practice). 
47 See, e.g. CESCR, General Comment 18, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, para. 24 (February 6, 
2006); and HRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l3, para. 8 
(May 26, 2004). 
48 See, e.g. sources cited at n. 11 above. 49 See, e.g. sources cited at nn. 12-13 above. 
50 See, e.g. CESCR, "Concluding Observations: Morocco," UN Doc. E/C.12/ 1/ Add .55, paras. 
30, 54 (December I, 2000) (urging state to protect people from contaminated foodstuffs 
causing death or serious illness). 
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obligations to fulfill. Obligations to fulfill require states to enable rights 
holders, rather than to restrain abusers. 
To understand how the two obligations intersect, consider the right 
to work. Dismissing an employee interferes with her right to work, but 
absent some discrimination or serious harm, it does not trigger an obliga-
tion to protect: the state need not restrain the employer from dismissing 
the employee. 51 Nevertheless, the state might have to fulfill the right- for 
example, by offering educational programs or trying to target the causes 
of unemployment. Because the obligations to protect and fulfill are com-
plementary, obligations to fulfill may render obligations to protect less 
compelling. Protecting people from workplace dismissal is less critical 
if they may easily transfer to new jobs. Moreover, some measures may 
satisfy both obligations simultaneously. Regulations mandating parental 
leave arguably protect women from workplace discrimination- conduct 
that triggers an obligation to protect. The same regulations might fulfill 
the right to work by enabling people to continue working after becoming 
parents. The distinction between obligations to protect and fulfill remains 
important, however, because the applicable obligation determines what 
the state must do. 
28.2.3 Reasonable measures 
A state that has the obligation to protect- because of its relationship with 
the abuser and the severity of the harm- must take reasonable measures 
of restraint. 52 Such measures differ in kind (for example, criminal or 
diplomatic sanction); in their intended immediate effect (for example, to 
avert an imminent harm or establish a general deterrent); and in their 
51 The CESCR asserts that the right to work grounds an obligation to protect, but the com-
mittee uses hopelessly vague language to define that obligation. CESCR, General Com-
ment 18, paras. 25, 35. Its most concrete suggestions are that states must protect against 
forced labor and must protect people who are especially vulnerable (paras. 25, 31 ). Those 
suggestions are consistent with my approach. ILO Convention (No. 158), Concerning 
Termination of Employment, adopted June 22, 1982, www.ilo.org/ ilolex/ cgi -lex/ convde. 
pi?Cl58, establishes slightly broader protections against workplace dismissal. However, 
that convention has been ratified by only thirty-four states, and its obligations are rarely 
invoked by, or before, the ILO. See www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm. 
52 My reasonableness standard is similar to the due diligence standard that appears in some 
of the practice. On due diligence standards, see generally R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, "The Due 
Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States," German Y. 
B. Int'l L., 35 ( 1992), 9. 
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target (for example, a particular abuser or a diffuse group of potential 
abusers). However, in any particular scenario, only some measures will be 
both available to the state and sufficient to satisfy its obligation to protect. 
The reasonableness standard is context-specific, but several factors 
inform the inquiry. First, reasonableness turns on both the state's rela-
tionship with the abuser and the severity of the harm. Those factors affect 
not only whether a state has the obligation, but also what the obliga-
tion requires. Measures that are reasonable for one kind of relationship or 
harm may be unreasonable for another. 53 Second, reasonableness depends 
on the degree of discretion afforded to states in any particular context. 
In some contexts, obligations to protect are well developed and specific. 
For example, states might have to investigate criminally and, if possible, 
prosecute the abuser. 54 In other contexts, states have more discretion to 
define their own measures. 55 Third, reasonableness depends on the scope 
of the problem. Case-specific measures may be necessary to avert even a 
single harm, 56 but a widespread problem suggests the need for systemic 
measures targeting the legal or behavioral patterns that contribute to 
abuse. 57 
Finally, reasonableness may depend on the state's capacity to restrain 
the abuser. A state is not absolved of an obligation simply because it lacks 
effective measures of restraint. The whole point of the obligation is to 
require states to develop those measures. Most of the practice assumes 
that states can develop such measures. And though states are disparately 
capable, the practice is circumspect about differentiating the obligation 
on that basis. 58 It should be less so. Defining reasonableness in part 
based on capacity would enjoin all states to make concerted efforts to 
restrain abusers, without requiring them to do that which they genuinely 
cannot. Further, it would permit each state to focus on its primary areas of 
concern- on abuses that are especially deep-seated or prevalent- instead 
of stretching its (inevitably limited) resources too thin. 
53 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," p. 373. 
54 See, e.g. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, December 
17, 1997,37 ILM 249 (1998). 
55 See, e.g. CEDAW, Art. 2(e) (requiring "appropriate" measures). 
56 See, e.g. Osman, para. ll6; and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women, "Communication No. 5/2005: Goekce v. Austria," UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005, para. 12.1.2 (August 6, 2007). 
57 See, e.g. da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No. 54/01, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/11.111, doc. 20 rev. para. 61(4) (2000); and CRC, "Report of the Eighth 
Session," UN Doc. CRC/C/38, para. 288 (February 20, 1995). 
58 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 374-6 (reviewing practice). 
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28.3 Concluding implications on the rights of the poor 
That framework explains when states must protect the poor from third-
party harm. First, a state usually must protect only its own poor. It need 
not protect the poor in other states unless it has a special relationship with 
the abuser. Second, a state must protect the poor from only some kinds of 
harm. This limitation is not as narrow as it may appear. Some conduct that 
triggers the obligation, like human trafficking, disproportionately affects 
the poor. 59 Other conduct, like race-based discrimination, may correlate 
highly with poverty. States must try to protect people - including poor 
people- from that conduct. Precisely what the state must do depends on 
the circumstances. But in all cases, states must make an affirmative effort 
to restrain actual or prospective abusers. 
Advocates for the poor may feel disheartened. The economic and social 
rights that are most relevant to the alleviation of poverty paradigmati-
cally trigger obligations to fulfill, not to protect. Obligations to fulfill 
remain frustratingly soft, notwithstanding considerable effort to make 
them operational.60 The solution is to continue developing those obliga-
tions. I conclude, then, with an example that both illustrates the protect-
fulfill distinction and shows promise for the obligation to fulfill. In Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, the South African Consti-
tutional Court forbade the state from removing squatters from private 
land.61 The decision's practical effect was to restrain private landown-
ers from evicting squatters. Yet Port Elizabeth does not stand for the 
proposition that the right to housing triggers an obligation to protect. 
Rather, the case is about the obligation to fulfill. 62 The government might 
have fulfilled the squatters' right to housing in all sorts of ways other 
than by restraining private landowners. For example, the government 
might have- and perhaps ideally would have- provided accommoda-
tion to people in need. Absent those alternatives, however, preventing 
59 See B. Carr, "When Federal and State Systems Converge: Foreign National Human Traf-
ficking Victims within Juvenile and Family Courts," juvenile and Family Court journal, 63 
(20 12), 77, 79: "Children who are vulnerable to trafficking often share common character-
istics and circumstances including ... impoverished childhoods ... [and] homelessness." 
60 For a recent discussion, see S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and 
Positive Duties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 77-90. 
61 Port Elizabeth Municipalityv. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
62 See Port Elizabeth, para. 56 (examining "the fulfilment of the rights of all to have access 
to adequate housing"). 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE POOR 
the eviction was the best option for fulfilling the right. 63 Port Elizabeth 
gave the obligation to fulfill real bite. 
63 Port Elizabeth, para. 58 ("The real question in this case is whether the Municipality has 
considered seriously or at all the request of these occupiers that they be provided with 
suitable alternative land ... "); and para. 61 (" [T]his decision in no way precludes further 
efforts to find a solution to a situation that is manifestly unsatisfactory to all concerned."). 
